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Why are central bankers shifting 
the goalposts? 
Daniel Gros 
he theme of this year’s meeting of the world’s central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
had little to do with monetary policy. “Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy” is, of 
course, an important topic. But it is telling that the European Central Bank also chose, 
for its own annual gathering, a similar non-monetary topic: “Investment and Growth in 
Advanced Countries”. 
There is nothing wrong with central bankers discussing challenges in areas like growth, trade 
and investment. But central banks are made independent precisely because it is understood 
that they are accountable for achieving their own objective of maintaining price stability, 
regardless of the economy’s underlying growth rate. So why is it that central bankers would 
rather look at external issues than focus on their own area of responsibility? 
So far, we have not yet received a satisfactory answer. 
The current conditions are favourable for monetary policy-making, particularly for the ECB – as 
a brief look at history makes clear. Since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) in January 1999, the ECB has been solely responsible for determining its monetary policy. 
(Although national currencies remained in circulation until 2002, exchange rates were 
“irrevocably” fixed in 1999.) 
The ECB’s job was hard from the beginning. After all, when the euro was born, global financial 
markets were in turmoil, owing to the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian default of 1998. The 
VIX index, which measures stock-market volatility, had hit 44% in August 1998, and during the 
euro’s first few years, it hovered around 25-30%, compared to around 12% today. While 
unemployment in the euro area was declining, the rate was close to 10%, and it remained 
higher than today’s level, 9.3%, for all of 1999. See Table 1 below. 
From a monetary-policy perspective, there was also a need to cope with the deflationary legacy 
of financial crisis. Indeed, when the euro area was established, prices were increasing by less 
than 2%, and headline inflation was stuck at around 1%. Those two key indicators of monetary 
policy are at almost exactly the same levels today, but financial markets are significantly more 
settled now than they were then. 
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Table 1. Changes in policy-relevant indicators in the euro area, the US and Japan (1999-2017) 
 
Activity 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Global 
VIX 
Headline 
inflation 
Core 
inflation* 
Policy 
rate 
CB access 
reserves 
(% of GDP)** 
EA 6.4 -0.3 -10.2 0.1 0.2 -3.0 22% 
US -0.9 0.3 -10.2 -0.5 -0.4 -4.1 14% 
Japan 10.1 -1.6 -10.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 70% 
Note: Green = improvement or higher inflation.  
* Core inflation is defined as the overall index excluding unprocessed food/all food. Both inflation and core 
inflation for 2017 are based on latest annual rate of change of July 2017.  
** Access reserves are estimated as total Central Bank liabilities less cash in circulation. Access reserves provide a 
good proxy for the scale of the unconventional monetary policies as these reflect the bond purchases within the 
QE programmes (see Gros, 2017).  
Data sources: AMECO and Eurostat. 
 
In 1999, despite slightly below-target inflation, high unemployment and financial-market 
volatility, the ECB Governing Council did not even consider zero or negative interest rates, much 
less unconventional policy measures. Instead, its first action, in 1999, was to fix the main policy 
rate at 2%. 
Over the course of that year, the ECB did cut the benchmark rate by 50 basis points, to the 
then-unprecedented level of 1.5%. But it did so just to give the economy a chance to recover. 
After a few months, it reversed course, putting the year-end policy rate back at 2%. Over the 
next year, the rate was raised to 3.75%, even though inflation had not accelerated by more 
than a few dozen basis points. 
Today, the ECB is facing a much more comfortable situation. While inflation is undershooting 
the 2% target by a similar amount, the labour market appears to be in much better shape. 
But is it? It is widely assumed that a deep recession induces many of the unemployed to leave 
the labour market, because looking for a job seems pointless. If many such discouraged workers 
have left the labour market, a recovery of the unemployment rate to pre-recession levels can 
be misleading. That is why the unemployment rate needs to be considered in conjunction with 
the labour-force participation rate. 
By that measure, the euro area is actually doing much better today than it was in 1999. With 
the labour-force participation rate five percentage points higher than it was back then, it seems 
clear that fewer workers have been discouraged from job-seeking today than at the start of 
EMU, and thus that there is less under-utilised potential in the economy. 
Against this background, it is difficult to explain why the ECB continues to insist that 
unconventional monetary policy measures – such as negative interest rates and continued 
bond purchases – are needed. The long-term inflation outlook might be somewhat more 
uncertain today. But can a few dozen basis points in (poorly measured) long-term inflation 
expectations justify the need for massive quantitative easing and a policy rate 250 points lower 
than it was at a time of weaker market fundamentals? 
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This incongruity is not limited to Europe. In the United States, too, one finds a similar 
combination of inflation and unemployment both today and two decades ago. In 1999, a core 
inflation rate of around 2%, combined with unemployment below 5%, justified a federal funds 
rate of 5% (and a ‘normal’ balance sheet). Today, the Federal Reserve has kept its benchmark 
rate below 1.5% – 350 basis points lower than in 1999 – and has postponed any reduction in 
its bloated balance sheet.1 
In Japan, inflation in now higher than it was in the wake of the Asian financial crisis; 
unemployment is at its lowest level in 50 years; and the labour-force participation rate 
continues to reach record highs. Yet Japan, like the US and Europe, continues to display a 
quixotic tendency to tilt at deflation windmills, with rock-bottom interest rates and purchases 
of massive amounts of government debt. 
Central bankers surely wish for a dynamic global economy. But that is something over which 
they have little influence. Rather than discussing issues that are extrinsic to their core concerns, 
they should focus on explaining why they have shifted their goalposts so much – and whether 
it is time to start moving them back. 
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1 We might also note that the only area for which all indicators would justify a more expansionary policy today is 
the US, whose central bank is also the only one that is actually tightening its policy. 
